OCR Specification focus:
‘Nasser’s relations with Britain, France, the United States and the USSR balanced rivalry and aid.’
Gamal Abdel Nasser’s foreign policy between 1952 and 1970 was defined by complex relations with Britain, France, the United States and the USSR, balancing rivalry, ideology and strategic necessity.
Nasser’s Foreign Policy Context
Nasser emerged as Egypt’s leader after the 1952 Free Officers’ coup, determined to end colonial domination and assert Egyptian independence. His foreign policy aimed to:
Secure sovereignty free from Western imperial influence.
Strengthen Egypt’s regional leadership and promote Pan-Arabism.
Modernise the state through military, economic and social development.
Exploit superpower rivalry during the Cold War for Egypt’s benefit.
These aims required strategic engagement with both Western powers (Britain, France, the United States) and the Soviet Union, often simultaneously balancing rivalry and cooperation.
Relations with Britain
Legacy of British Imperialism
Britain had long dominated Egypt, controlling the Suez Canal and maintaining troops in the Suez Canal Zone since 1882. Nasser viewed British presence as a violation of Egypt’s sovereignty.
Britain sought to maintain control over Suez as a strategic imperial artery.
Egypt demanded full withdrawal of British troops.
Suez Canal Negotiations and British Withdrawal
After protracted negotiations:
In 1954, Britain agreed to withdraw troops from the Suez Canal Zone by 1956, a major nationalist victory for Nasser.
Britain retained the right to return in the event of external aggression against an Arab state or Turkey.
This withdrawal enhanced Nasser’s domestic legitimacy and symbolised the end of formal British military occupation, but tensions remained over Egypt’s growing independence and nationalist rhetoric.
Suez Crisis and Breakdown of Relations
Nasser’s nationalisation of the Suez Canal in July 1956 provoked British outrage, as it threatened their strategic and economic interests.
Gamal Abdel Nasser is cheered in Cairo days after announcing the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company. The image captures the popular momentum behind Egypt’s assertion of sovereignty and helps explain why London and Paris misread Egypt’s resolve. The photograph focuses on the leader–crowd dynamic and avoids extraneous detail. Source
Britain, France, and Israel launched a joint invasion (Suez Crisis, October 1956) to regain Western control and depose Nasser.
The intervention failed due to US and Soviet pressure at the United Nations, forcing a withdrawal.
The crisis:
Marked Britain’s decline as a Middle Eastern power.
Transformed Nasser into a Pan-Arab hero.
Cemented long-term hostility between Egypt and Britain until the late 1960s.
Relations with France
French Concerns and Hostility
France shared Britain’s imperial interests in the region and was angered by:
Nasser’s support for Algerian independence fighters (FLN) during the Algerian War of Independence (1954–1962).
The nationalisation of the Suez Canal, which France co-owned.
Suez Collaboration and Consequences
France was a principal architect of the Suez invasion, seeking to topple Nasser and protect its imperial and economic interests.
The defeat humiliated France and hardened its hostility towards Nasser.
After 1956, relations remained tense, with France aligning more closely with Israel and conservative Arab regimes. France’s diminishing influence in the Middle East, however, limited the long-term impact of this rivalry.
Relations with the United States
Initial Engagement and Strategic Importance
The United States initially viewed Nasser as a potential ally in containing Soviet influence. Egypt’s control of the Suez Canal and leadership in the Arab world made it strategically significant.
The US supported Egyptian independence from British and French colonial rule.
Nasser hoped for American financial and military aid to modernise Egypt.
Aswan Dam Crisis and Breakdown of Trust
The Aswan High Dam was central to Nasser’s development plans, requiring substantial funding.
Initially, the US and Britain offered financial support but withdrew it in 1956, citing concerns over Egypt’s recognition of Communist China and arms deals with the Soviet bloc.
In response, Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal, using revenues to fund the dam.
This event marked a turning point, leading to growing mistrust between Cairo and Washington.
Eisenhower Doctrine and US Opposition
The Eisenhower Doctrine (1957) offered US aid to Middle Eastern states resisting communism. Nasser opposed it, viewing it as neo-imperial interference.
The US accused Nasser of destabilising pro-Western regimes and supporting anti-colonial movements.
Relations deteriorated further after the 1967 Six-Day War, in which the US strongly supported Israel.
Despite tensions, the US continued to recognise Egypt’s strategic importance, and occasional pragmatic engagement persisted.
Relations with the USSR
Ideological Differences and Strategic Convergence
While Egypt remained officially non-aligned, Nasser recognised the advantages of partnership with the Soviet Union.
Non-alignment: A foreign policy stance during the Cold War whereby a state sought to remain independent of both the Western and Soviet blocs, often engaging with both to maximise national interests.
Despite ideological differences — Egypt was not a communist state — both shared opposition to Western imperialism and support for anti-colonial movements.
Arms and Economic Aid
The USSR became a vital source of military and economic support:
In 1955, Egypt secured a major arms deal with Czechoslovakia, arranged by the USSR, circumventing Western restrictions.
After the Aswan Dam funding was withdrawn by the West, the Soviets financed and helped construct the dam, completed in 1970.
High-resolution astronaut photography shows the Aswan High Dam and Lake Nasser in southern Egypt. Begun in 1960 and completed in 1970, the project exemplified Egypt’s turn to Soviet economic and technical assistance. The image includes wider geographic context beyond the dam itself, which is helpful for orientation though not required by the syllabus. Source
Soviet advisors assisted in industrial and infrastructural projects across Egypt.
This cooperation strengthened Egypt’s military and economic independence.
Cold War Alliance and Strategic Depth
Egypt became a key Soviet ally in the Middle East:
The USSR supported Nasser diplomatically during the Suez Crisis, condemning Anglo-French aggression.
Soviet support intensified after the 1967 defeat, providing extensive arms and advisors to rebuild Egypt’s military.
However, Nasser resisted full Soviet control, maintaining Egypt’s non-aligned status and balancing Soviet aid with Arab nationalist goals.
Balancing Rivalry and Aid
Nasser’s foreign policy was defined by his ability to manipulate Cold War rivalries to Egypt’s advantage. His approach included:
Exploiting superpower competition to secure arms, economic aid, and diplomatic support without formal alliances.
Rejecting military pacts such as the Baghdad Pact (1955) to preserve independence.
Positioning Egypt as a leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, hosting the 1961 Belgrade Conference with Yugoslavia and India.
Leaders at the Belgrade Conference (September 1961), the first summit of the Non-Aligned Movement. The image situates Nasser among peers such as Tito, Nehru and others, clarifying Egypt’s diplomatic strategy beyond the superpower blocs. This photograph focuses on the plenary hall; it does not detail subsequent NAM conferences. Source
Maintaining flexibility to switch partners when strategic needs changed.
This balancing act enabled Egypt to pursue national development, resist imperialism, and project leadership in the Arab world, though it also drew Egypt deeply into superpower rivalries and regional conflicts.
FAQ
After Suez, Nasser emerged as a leading figure of Arab nationalism and gained immense regional prestige. The crisis convinced him that Western powers could no longer dictate Middle Eastern affairs, prompting a pivot towards the Soviet Union for economic and military support.
He intensified his non-aligned stance, using Cold War rivalry to extract aid while rejecting direct military alliances. Nasser also expanded Egypt’s influence through propaganda, support for anti-colonial movements, and leadership in the Arab world.
The US believed Nasser could be a stabilising force in the Arab world and a counterweight to Soviet influence. Egypt’s control over the Suez Canal and its central geographic position made it strategically vital to Western interests.
Washington also hoped that supporting Egypt’s modernisation would limit communist appeal in the region. However, ideological differences, Nasser’s anti-imperialist rhetoric, and his refusal to align with the West eventually eroded this early optimism.
The Czech Arms Deal was a turning point that deepened Soviet-Egyptian ties. Unable to acquire weapons from Western suppliers, Egypt secured arms through Czechoslovakia, acting as a Soviet proxy.
This demonstrated Nasser’s determination to assert independence and modernise the military without Western conditions. It also alarmed the United States and Britain, signalling the USSR’s growing influence in the Middle East and reshaping Cold War dynamics in the region.
Non-alignment allowed Nasser to maintain diplomatic flexibility. He accepted Soviet arms, loans, and technical assistance while rejecting full political alignment with the communist bloc.
Simultaneously, he engaged selectively with the United States when it suited Egypt’s interests, especially on issues of trade and aid. This dual approach helped Egypt secure benefits from both superpowers while preserving autonomy and leadership among newly independent nations.
Nasser’s assertive diplomacy elevated Egypt as a leader of the Arab world. His anti-imperialist stance and successes, such as the Suez Canal nationalisation, inspired nationalist movements across the region.
Through the promotion of Pan-Arabism, he positioned Cairo as a centre of Arab unity. His involvement in conflicts like the Yemen Civil War and support for liberation movements extended Egypt’s reach, although such policies also strained resources and contributed to setbacks, particularly after the 1967 defeat.
Practice Questions
Question 1 (2 marks)
Identify two ways in which the Soviet Union supported Nasser’s Egypt between 1955 and 1970.
Mark Scheme:
Award 1 mark for each correct identification.
Provided military support, including arms deals such as the 1955 Czechoslovakia agreement. (1)
Financed and helped construct the Aswan High Dam after Western funding was withdrawn. (1)
Supplied military advisors and assistance, especially after the 1967 Six-Day War. (1)
(Maximum 2 marks)
Question 2 (6 marks)
Explain how Nasser balanced rivalry and aid in his relations with the Great Powers between 1952 and 1970.
Mark Scheme:
Level 1 (1–2 marks): Limited description of events with little or no explanation. May mention one Great Power without linking to rivalry or aid.
Example: “Nasser worked with the USSR and had problems with Britain.” (1)
Level 2 (3–4 marks): Some explanation of how Nasser balanced rivalry and aid, but answers may lack depth or range. May refer to two Great Powers but unevenly.
Example: “Nasser accepted Soviet aid to build the Aswan Dam after the USA withdrew funding, showing how he used rivalry to his advantage.” (3–4)
Level 3 (5–6 marks): Clear and developed explanation of how Nasser balanced rivalry and aid, supported with accurate detail and reference to at least two Great Powers.
Example: “Nasser balanced rivalry and aid by exploiting Cold War tensions. He accepted Soviet support for the Aswan Dam and arms while maintaining Egypt’s non-aligned status. Despite hostility with Britain and France over Suez, he initially sought US aid and later rejected the Eisenhower Doctrine to protect Egyptian independence.” (5–6)
