OCR Specification focus:
‘Assess the Kaiser’s and government’s responsibility for the outbreak of the First World War, 1914.’
The outbreak of the First World War in 1914 remains one of history’s most contested debates, with Wilhelm II, German leaders and structural forces all scrutinised for responsibility.
The Kaiser’s Role in Escalating Tensions
Wilhelm II’s Personality and Ambitions
Kaiser Wilhelm II was a pivotal figure in pre-war Germany, and his impulsive nature, militarism and erratic foreign policy significantly heightened international tensions.

Kaiser Wilhelm II, 1902. An official studio portrait widely used by scholars to discuss the Kaiser’s image, authority and militaristic posture. The photograph supports evaluation of his role in shaping Weltpolitik and crisis decision-making in 1914. Source
Militarism: The belief in building up strong armed forces and readiness to use them aggressively to defend or promote national interests.
Wilhelm II’s pursuit of Weltpolitik (“world policy”) marked a shift from Bismarck’s cautious diplomacy to an assertive imperialism aimed at expanding German influence. His desire for Germany to achieve “a place in the sun” reflected ambitions for colonial expansion and global power projection. This aggressive posture unsettled the delicate balance of power in Europe and contributed to deteriorating relations with other great powers, particularly Britain and France.
Personal Diplomacy and Diplomatic Missteps
The Kaiser’s reliance on personal diplomacy often destabilised international relations. His inconsistent statements, such as the notorious Daily Telegraph Affair (1908), alienated allies and reinforced perceptions of Germany as unpredictable. Moreover, Wilhelm’s increasing marginalisation from policymaking by the 1910s limited his direct control, yet his rhetoric and preferences continued to shape decisions.
Government Responsibility and Policy Choices
The Role of Bethmann Hollweg and the Political Elite
Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, Chancellor from 1909, shared responsibility for decisions that led to war. He authorised policies that intensified tensions, such as military expansion and support for Austria-Hungary during the July Crisis. The German leadership’s decision to issue a “blank cheque” of unconditional support to Austria on 5 July 1914 emboldened Vienna to adopt a hardline stance against Serbia, making war more likely.
The government also promoted a policy of Mitteleuropa—a vision of German dominance in Central and Eastern Europe—which implied expansionist ambitions and antagonised rival powers.
The Schlieffen Plan and Strategic Decisions
German military planning also reveals state responsibility. The Schlieffen Plan—a pre-emptive strategy designed to defeat France rapidly before turning east against Russia—depended on rapid mobilisation and necessitated violating Belgian neutrality.

Schlieffen Plan, 1914. This vector map shows Germany’s planned offensive through Belgium and northern France before pivoting east against Russia. It illustrates how operational planning hard-wired escalation and made British intervention more likely due to the treaty obligations over Belgium. Source
This decision brought Britain into the war and transformed a regional crisis into a global conflict.
Blank Cheque: Germany’s unconditional support pledged to Austria-Hungary on 5 July 1914, encouraging aggressive action against Serbia after the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand.
These decisions were not inevitable; they reflected deliberate choices by German policymakers to prioritise military solutions over diplomatic alternatives.
Domestic Pressures and the Influence of Militarism
Social and Political Context
Germany’s domestic situation influenced its foreign policy. The rise of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), industrial unrest and calls for reform created internal tensions. Some historians argue that elites sought an external conflict to unite the nation and divert attention from domestic issues—a concept known as the “escape forward” thesis.
The military’s dominance in policy-making further constrained civilian oversight. Figures such as General Helmuth von Moltke and the General Staff prioritised military considerations over diplomatic ones, pressing for rapid mobilisation once war appeared imminent.
Naval Expansion and the Arms Race
Germany’s decision to challenge British naval supremacy through a massive fleet-building programme under Admiral Tirpitz exacerbated Anglo-German rivalry. The Second Naval Law (1900) and subsequent expansions symbolised German ambitions and contributed to escalating tensions. This arms race fuelled mutual suspicion and entrenched alliance commitments, leaving little room for compromise in a crisis.
The July Crisis of 1914
German Actions and Escalation
The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo on 28 June 1914 triggered the July Crisis. Germany’s decision to back Austria-Hungary unconditionally transformed a bilateral conflict into a European one. Despite opportunities to restrain Vienna, Berlin encouraged swift action, even as Russian mobilisation became increasingly likely.
On 31 July, Germany issued ultimatums to Russia and France, and on 1 August declared war on Russia. The subsequent declaration against France and invasion of Belgium on 4 August ensured British entry into the war. German decision-making during these crucial weeks reveals both strategic calculation and reckless brinkmanship.
Misjudgement and Overconfidence
German leaders underestimated the likelihood of British intervention and overestimated the speed and effectiveness of the Schlieffen Plan. The “war by timetable” mentality—once mobilisation began, it was difficult to reverse—reduced diplomatic flexibility and made escalation almost inevitable.
Historiographical Interpretations of Responsibility
Fischer Thesis and German War Guilt
Historian Fritz Fischer famously argued that Germany pursued a “Griff nach der Weltmacht” (“bid for world power”), suggesting that its leaders deliberately sought war to achieve expansionist aims. According to Fischer, German elites saw war as a solution to internal tensions and a path to imperial dominance, making them chiefly responsible for the conflict.
Revisionist Perspectives
Other historians emphasise shared responsibility. They argue that the complex alliance system, nationalism, imperial rivalries, and militarism across Europe created a volatile environment. From this view, Germany’s actions were aggressive but not uniquely so; other powers also escalated tensions.
Structuralist Approaches
Structuralist historians highlight bureaucratic inertia, military planning, and systemic factors over individual decisions. They argue that German leaders were constrained by the militarised state apparatus and the logic of mobilisation, limiting their ability to avoid war once the crisis began.
Assessment of Responsibility
Balancing Agency and Structure
The debate over responsibility involves weighing individual agency—particularly that of Wilhelm II and Bethmann Hollweg—against broader structural forces such as militarism, alliance commitments, and domestic instability. Germany’s aggressive policies, strategic decisions, and support for Austria were decisive in transforming a regional crisis into a world war. Yet these choices were made within a context of systemic pressures and mutual distrust that shaped the actions of all major powers.
Germany’s leadership bears significant responsibility for the outbreak of war in 1914, but it was not the sole architect of catastrophe. Rather, the conflict emerged from a complex interplay of individual ambition, state policy, strategic miscalculations, and structural conditions that engulfed Europe in war.
FAQ
The December 1912 “war council” meeting, attended by Kaiser Wilhelm II and top military leaders, revealed Germany’s growing readiness for a major conflict. Although not an official policy meeting, it exposed deep concerns about Russia’s growing power and urged quicker military preparation.
Key generals argued that war might be necessary before Russia became too strong. While civilian leaders like Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg were not present, the meeting highlighted the influence of military thinking on German policy. It reinforced the belief that strategic timing would be crucial and encouraged future decisions based on pre-emptive action rather than diplomacy.
Public opinion in pre-war Germany was shaped by nationalist sentiment, press campaigns, and fears of encirclement by hostile powers. The government, aware of rising nationalism, often adopted policies that mirrored public attitudes.
Newspapers and nationalist leagues, such as the Pan-German League, promoted militarism and expansionism.
Leaders believed a successful war could unite the population and reduce support for socialist movements like the SPD.
Popular enthusiasm for imperial ambition encouraged leaders to pursue Weltpolitik, strengthening the case for aggressive policies during the July Crisis.
Public opinion did not dictate policy, but it created a political environment in which backing down could seem weak or unpatriotic.
Germany’s strategic position fostered a deep fear of encirclement by France and Russia, formal allies since 1894. This shaped German decision-making in 1914.
Leaders feared a two-front war and saw the crisis as an opportunity to confront Russia and France before they grew stronger.
The Schlieffen Plan itself was designed as a response to encirclement, aiming to defeat France swiftly before turning east.
Support for Austria-Hungary was partly motivated by the belief that weakening Serbia would limit Russian influence in the Balkans.
Encirclement fears pushed Germany towards aggressive, pre-emptive policies, increasing the risk of turning a regional conflict into a wider war.
Germany’s membership in the Triple Alliance with Austria-Hungary and Italy shaped its responses in 1914. While alliances were meant for defence, they encouraged risk-taking.
Germany felt obliged to support Austria-Hungary to maintain the alliance and its only reliable continental partner.
Leaders believed that failing to support Austria would leave Germany isolated and vulnerable to the Triple Entente of France, Russia, and Britain.
This alliance logic made restraint more difficult, as withdrawal could undermine Germany’s diplomatic position and credibility.
Thus, alliance commitments intensified Germany’s involvement and made escalation more likely, even when diplomatic alternatives existed.
German leaders underestimated Britain’s willingness to defend Belgian neutrality, guaranteed by the 1839 Treaty of London. They assumed Britain might remain neutral if Germany promised post-war compensation.
This miscalculation stemmed from:
Belief that Britain was more focused on naval power and empire than continental conflicts.
Overconfidence in the rapid success of the Schlieffen Plan, expecting the war to be over before Britain could intervene.
Misreading British foreign policy signals, interpreting attempts at mediation as signs of unwillingness to fight.
Britain’s declaration of war on 4 August 1914 shocked German leaders, demonstrating how strategic misjudgements contributed to Germany’s share of responsibility for the outbreak of war.
Practice Questions
Question 1 (2 marks):
Identify two ways in which Kaiser Wilhelm II’s foreign policy contributed to rising tensions before 1914.
Mark Scheme:
Award 1 mark for each correct way identified, up to a maximum of 2 marks.
Adoption of Weltpolitik, an aggressive foreign policy aimed at expanding German influence and empire. (1)
Naval expansion under Admiral Tirpitz, which increased Anglo-German rivalry. (1)
Unpredictable and provocative statements, such as those made in the Daily Telegraph Affair. (1)
Support for Austria-Hungary during the July Crisis, which encouraged confrontation with Serbia and Russia. (1)
Question 2 (6 marks):
Explain how German government decisions contributed to the outbreak of the First World War in 1914.
Mark Scheme:
Level 1 (1–2 marks): Basic description with limited detail or explanation.
May identify one or two decisions but lacks development.
Limited reference to how they led to war.
Examples:
Mentions the Schlieffen Plan but does not explain its impact.
States that Germany supported Austria-Hungary without elaboration.
Level 2 (3–4 marks): Some explanation with relevant examples.
Explains more than one decision with some link to war causation.
Some reference to consequences or escalation.
Examples:
Explains the “blank cheque” support to Austria-Hungary and how it emboldened Austria’s actions.
Mentions the Schlieffen Plan and how it involved violating Belgian neutrality, bringing Britain into the war.
Level 3 (5–6 marks): Clear, well-developed explanation with precise examples and clear causal links.
Explains multiple decisions and shows how they directly contributed to the outbreak of war.
Demonstrates understanding of how government actions turned a regional crisis into a wider conflict.
Examples:
Explains that the “blank cheque” emboldened Austria to act aggressively against Serbia, escalating the crisis.
Discusses how reliance on the Schlieffen Plan meant war plans could not easily be reversed, leading to declarations of war.
Explains how German ultimatums to Russia and France and the invasion of Belgium widened the conflict and ensured British involvement.