OCR Specification focus:
‘Politburo changes in 1966 empowered radicals; the army’s influence expanded.’
The Cultural Revolution of 1966 transformed China’s political landscape as radical forces gained dominance in the Politburo and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) assumed a decisive political role.
The Politburo Before 1966: Conservative Dominance and Mao’s Marginalisation
Structure and Role of the Politburo
The Politburo was the executive committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the centre of political decision-making in the People’s Republic of China.
Politburo: The top decision-making body of the CCP, composed of senior Party leaders, responsible for policy direction and strategic decisions.
In the early 1960s, the Politburo was dominated by pragmatists such as Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, and Chen Yun, who sought recovery after the Great Leap Forward.
These leaders prioritised economic stabilisation, technocratic expertise, and moderate policies over Mao’s utopian revolutionary vision.
Mao Zedong, once the unchallenged leader, became increasingly marginalised, holding symbolic authority but limited influence over day-to-day governance.
This growing divide between radicals (ideological revolutionaries loyal to Mao) and pragmatists (realists focused on economic development) set the stage for the upheavals of 1966.
Politburo Changes in 1966: The Rise of Radical Influence
Purges and Political Realignment
In 1966, Mao launched a dramatic reshaping of the Politburo to regain control and reassert his revolutionary agenda:
Liu Shaoqi, the state president and Mao’s designated successor, was denounced as a “capitalist roader” and removed from power.
Deng Xiaoping, another leading pragmatist, was similarly purged and sent for “re-education” through labour.
Their removal created a power vacuum that Mao filled with radical loyalists aligned with his Cultural Revolution objectives.
Empowerment of Mao’s Allies
Mao strategically elevated key radicals to the Politburo, transforming its character and priorities:
Lin Biao, Minister of Defence, was promoted as Mao’s heir apparent, gaining significant authority over both Party and military affairs.
Mao Zedong appears alongside Lin Biao, whose ascent exemplified the Politburo’s radical turn and the PLA’s growing political weight during the Cultural Revolution. The image visually anchors Lin’s proximity to Mao and helps explain why military influence surged inside party leadership. Source
Chen Boda, a theorist and Mao’s close advisor, became a crucial ideological voice, shaping propaganda and Party doctrine.
Jiang Qing, Mao’s wife, alongside the “Gang of Four”, gained increasing political influence, spearheading campaigns against perceived enemies within the Party.
These appointments ensured that the Politburo became an instrument of Maoist revolution, replacing technocratic governance with ideological fervour.
The Central Cultural Revolution Group (CCRG): A New Power Structure
Establishment and Role
Mao created the Central Cultural Revolution Group (CCRG) in May 1966, formally subordinated to the Politburo but effectively superseding it in power.
The CCRG was led by radicals like Chen Boda, Kang Sheng, and Jiang Qing, who reported directly to Mao.
It became the true command centre of the Cultural Revolution, directing mass movements, purges, and ideological campaigns.
This new body further weakened traditional Politburo authority, consolidating Mao’s control and embedding radical influence at the highest levels of the Party.
The Army’s Expanding Role: From Support to Central Power
Mao’s Turn to the People’s Liberation Army
By late 1966, the Red Guards—student groups unleashed to attack “capitalist roaders”—had plunged China into widespread chaos and violence. Mao turned to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to restore order and safeguard the revolution.
People’s Liberation Army (PLA): The unified military forces of the People’s Republic of China, historically aligned with the CCP and instrumental in maintaining Party rule.
Political Militarisation
The PLA’s role extended far beyond traditional military functions:
Lin Biao’s influence grew enormously as the PLA was tasked with restoring stability, protecting radical leadership, and enforcing Maoist policies.
Military officials were appointed to provincial revolutionary committees, replacing discredited Party cadres and assuming direct control over governance.
Mass rally celebrating the formation of the Beijing Revolutionary Committee (1967), a model of the army–cadres–masses alliance used to replace conventional party-state structures. Such committees institutionalised PLA authority within civilian administration, exemplifying the expansion of military influence from 1966 onward. Source
The PLA took charge of factories, schools, and local administrations, embedding itself deeply into civilian life.
This militarisation of governance marked a significant departure from previous practice and underscored the army’s emergence as a pillar of Maoist authority.
The Army as an Instrument of Maoist Ideology
The Cult of Mao and Political Indoctrination
The PLA did more than impose order; it became a vehicle for ideological transformation:
Under Lin Biao’s direction, the army championed the “Little Red Book”—Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong—turning it into a symbol of revolutionary loyalty.
High-resolution image of Quotations from Chairman Mao (“Little Red Book”), widely disseminated by the PLA’s political apparatus and used in political education campaigns. This visual reinforces the fusion of ideology and military authority described in 1966–67. Extra detail: the photo was taken at a market stall, which is not required by the syllabus but provides a clear, labelled view of the book. Source
Soldiers participated in political education campaigns, spreading Maoist thought among the populace and reinforcing Mao’s cult of personality.
The PLA actively supported purges of “counter-revolutionaries”, including senior Party officials, intellectuals, and cultural figures.
The result was a profound fusion of military authority and political ideology, blurring the lines between Party, state, and army.
Consequences of Politburo Change and Military Ascendancy
Radicalisation of Governance
The restructuring of the Politburo and the empowerment of the PLA had far-reaching consequences:
Decision-making became ideologically driven, prioritising revolutionary purity over pragmatic policy.
The state apparatus was destabilised, with traditional bureaucratic structures replaced by revolutionary committees dominated by military and radical leaders.
The CCRG and Politburo acted as instruments of Mao’s personal authority rather than collective Party governance.
Centralisation of Power
Mao successfully reasserted personal control over the CCP:
By 1969, the Ninth Party Congress confirmed Lin Biao as Mao’s successor, solidifying the alliance between Mao and the military.
The Politburo was now firmly under Maoist control, ensuring that radical revolution remained the state’s guiding principle.
This transformation fundamentally altered the nature of political power in China, establishing a precedent for the fusion of Party and military authority that would continue beyond the Cultural Revolution.
FAQ
The purges of Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping removed the most influential pragmatists from leadership, dismantling resistance to Mao’s ideological revival. Their downfall allowed Mao to fill the Politburo with loyal radicals who supported continuous revolution and reliance on mass mobilisation.
This shift weakened collective leadership and concentrated power around Mao, enabling decisions that directly expanded the role of the PLA in governance and ideology. It also set a precedent that political survival depended on unwavering loyalty to Maoist principles.
Although technically a subordinate organ, the Central Cultural Revolution Group (CCRG) quickly became more powerful than the Politburo in directing Cultural Revolution policy.
It acted as the de facto leadership body, issuing directives and overseeing purges.
Members such as Chen Boda and Jiang Qing bypassed traditional channels, reporting directly to Mao.
The CCRG’s dominance marginalised established institutions and accelerated the shift of authority from bureaucrats to radicals and military figures.
By late 1966, the Cultural Revolution’s mass mobilisation—especially the Red Guards—had spiralled into chaos, paralysing industry, transport, and governance.
Mao turned to the PLA because:
It was one of the few national institutions still functioning effectively.
Lin Biao’s loyalty ensured the army would enforce Maoist ideology.
Military discipline provided the means to re-establish control over provinces and suppress violent factionalism.
The PLA’s involvement marked a turning point, embedding military authority in political life.
Revolutionary committees replaced traditional Party and state structures, combining PLA officers, radical cadres, and mass representatives.
They acted as both administrative and political bodies, enforcing Maoist policies and maintaining order.
The inclusion of PLA members gave the army unprecedented authority in civil governance.
These committees blurred boundaries between military and civilian roles, institutionalising the militarisation of politics and consolidating Maoist control at all levels of government.
The PLA actively disseminated Maoist ideology, elevating Mao’s status to near-religious levels.
Soldiers distributed and studied the Little Red Book, integrating it into daily routines and political education.
Military parades, songs, and performances glorified Mao as the embodiment of revolutionary truth.
PLA-led propaganda campaigns ensured that loyalty to Mao became a measure of political legitimacy.
This ideological mission entrenched the army not only as an enforcer of order but also as a guardian of Maoist orthodoxy, strengthening its political influence.
Practice Questions
Question 1 (2 marks):
Identify two ways in which the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) increased its influence in China during the Cultural Revolution of 1966.
Mark scheme:
Award 1 mark for each correct identification, up to a maximum of 2 marks.
Possible answers include:
By taking control of provincial revolutionary committees. (1 mark)
By assuming responsibility for restoring order after Red Guard violence. (1 mark)
By spreading Maoist ideology through political education campaigns. (1 mark)
By protecting and supporting radical leadership aligned with Mao. (1 mark)
Question 2 (6 marks):
Explain how changes to the Politburo in 1966 contributed to the growing power of the army in China.
Mark scheme:
Level 1 (1–2 marks):
Simple or general statements with little detail or explanation.
Example: “The Politburo changed and the army became more powerful.”
Level 2 (3–4 marks):
Some explanation of the link between Politburo changes and the army’s power, though detail may be limited or uneven.
Example: “Mao purged moderates from the Politburo and replaced them with loyal radicals. This allowed the PLA to become more influential.”
Level 3 (5–6 marks):
Clear and developed explanation showing understanding of how Politburo changes directly enabled the PLA’s expanded role.
Points may include:
Purges of Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping removed pragmatists and allowed Maoist radicals such as Lin Biao to rise. (1–2 marks)
Lin Biao’s promotion as Defence Minister and heir apparent strengthened the PLA’s political influence. (1–2 marks)
Military officials were appointed to revolutionary committees, embedding the PLA in governance. (1–2 marks)
The Politburo’s radical turn and Mao’s reliance on the army blurred lines between Party and military authority. (1–2 marks)
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