TutorChase logo
Login
OCR A-Level History Study Notes

58.5.4 Arabs, Jews and Proposed Solutions

OCR Specification focus:
‘Relations with Arabs and Jews examined proposed solutions to conflicting national aspirations.’

Between 1908 and 1948, British policy in the Middle East was shaped by conflicting Arab and Jewish national aspirations, prompting numerous proposed solutions that ultimately failed to resolve tensions.

Conflicting National Aspirations under the British Mandate

Following the First World War, Britain acquired the Mandate for Palestine under the League of Nations in 1922. This period was defined by irreconcilable ambitions:

  • Zionist aims: Establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine, as promised in the Balfour Declaration (1917).

  • Arab aims: Preservation of Arab dominance and rejection of large-scale Jewish immigration, based on earlier McMahon–Hussein correspondence (1915–16) promises of Arab independence.

The result was escalating tension as Britain struggled to balance both sides’ aspirations.

British Policy and Early Attempts to Reconcile Differences

The Balfour Declaration and Its Ambiguities

Britain’s Balfour Declaration promised support for a Jewish homeland but also stated that “nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities.”
This ambiguity created deep mistrust:

Facsimile of the Balfour Declaration (2 November 1917), the British statement supporting a “national home for the Jewish people” while pledging not to prejudice the rights of “non-Jewish communities.” This document’s ambiguity underpinned later White Papers and the turn to partition as a proposed remedy. Source

  • Jews interpreted it as a green light for large-scale immigration.

  • Arabs viewed it as a betrayal of wartime promises and a threat to their majority status.

White Papers and Restrictive Policies

Britain attempted to clarify or limit the scope of Zionist aims through successive White Papers:

  • 1922 Churchill White Paper: Reaffirmed the Balfour Declaration but restricted Jewish immigration to Palestine’s “economic absorptive capacity.”

  • 1930 Passfield White Paper: Proposed limiting immigration and land sales to protect Arab interests, provoking fierce Zionist opposition.

  • 1939 MacDonald White Paper: Sought a binational solution, limiting Jewish immigration to 75,000 over five years and envisaging an independent Palestinian state within 10 years, governed jointly by Arabs and Jews.

The 1939 White Paper marked a significant policy shift toward appeasing Arab concerns, driven partly by Britain’s strategic need for Arab support on the eve of World War II. However, it alienated the Zionist movement, especially during the Holocaust, when European Jews were desperate for refuge.

Rising Tensions and Violence

The 1920s and 1930s saw mounting hostility as:

  • Jewish immigration surged, driven by European antisemitism and Nazi persecution.

  • Arab opposition intensified, culminating in the Arab Revolt (1936–1939) against both British rule and Zionist settlement.

The revolt demonstrated Arab determination to resist Zionist expansion and exposed Britain’s inability to maintain stability without repressive measures.

Partition as a Proposed Solution

The 1937 Peel Commission

Britain’s Peel Commission, established to investigate the Arab Revolt, concluded that coexistence within a single state was impossible. It proposed partitioning Palestine:

Map of the Peel Commission (1937) partition proposal for Mandatory Palestine, indicating a small Jewish state, a larger Arab state, and a British-administered enclave around Jerusalem. This visual clarifies why partition entered the policy mainstream following the Arab Revolt. Labels are concise and well placed for A-Level study. Source

  • A small Jewish state in the north and along the coast.

  • A larger Arab state to be united with Transjordan.

  • Jerusalem and holy sites under British mandate.

Key reactions:

  • Zionists: Accepted partition in principle, despite objections to the proposed borders.

  • Arabs: Rejected partition outright, refusing to cede any territory to a Jewish state.

The plan failed, but it established partition as a recurring theme in future proposals.

Postwar Developments and New Proposals

Impact of the Holocaust and Jewish Displacement

After 1945, the plight of Holocaust survivors intensified international support for a Jewish homeland. Pressure from the United States, including President Harry S. Truman, forced Britain to reconsider immigration limits.

Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry (1946)

Formed to address the refugee crisis and the future of Palestine, the committee recommended:

  • Immediate admission of 100,000 Jewish refugees.

  • Continuation of the British mandate under revised terms.

  • Rejection of partition at that stage.

Arab leaders rejected the recommendations, while Zionists saw them as inadequate. Britain refused to implement them without broader agreement, which proved impossible.

United Nations Involvement and the 1947 Partition Plan

The UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP)

Unable to resolve the crisis, Britain referred the issue to the United Nations in 1947. UNSCOP proposed partitioning Palestine into independent Arab and Jewish states, with Jerusalem under international administration.

United Nations Partition Plan (1947) showing proposed Arab and Jewish states with Jerusalem set apart under international administration. The map neatly communicates the territorial mosaic that made implementation difficult. It aligns precisely with the features summarised in UNGA Resolution 181. Source

Main features of UN Resolution 181 (November 1947):

  • 55% of land allocated to a Jewish state, despite Jews being only one-third of the population.

  • 45% allocated to an Arab state.

  • Jerusalem as a corpus separatum (separate international zone).

Zionist leaders accepted the plan, though reluctantly, while Arab leaders and neighbouring Arab states rejected it completely, arguing it violated the rights of the Arab majority and imposed a solution without their consent.

Key Reasons for the Failure of Proposed Solutions

Despite numerous proposals, none achieved lasting peace before 1948 due to several fundamental obstacles:

  • Mutually exclusive nationalisms: Both Arabs and Jews viewed Palestine as their rightful homeland and refused to compromise on sovereignty.

  • Demographic concerns: Arabs feared becoming a minority; Jews feared restrictions on immigration and statehood.

  • Strategic British interests: Britain prioritised imperial stability, often leading to contradictory promises and policies.

  • Lack of trust: Each side doubted Britain’s impartiality and the other’s willingness to coexist.

  • Escalating violence: Riots, revolts, and terrorism by both sides undermined diplomatic initiatives.

The End of the Mandate and Legacy

By 1947–48, Britain concluded that reconciliation was impossible. It announced its withdrawal from Palestine, leaving the UN plan as the final proposed solution. On 14 May 1948, the State of Israel was declared, triggering the First Arab–Israeli War as neighbouring states invaded.

The unresolved conflict over national aspirations continued beyond 1948, shaping Middle Eastern politics for decades. The proposed solutions of the mandate period laid the groundwork for future diplomatic efforts but failed to resolve the deep-rooted dispute between Arab nationalism and Zionism.

FAQ

The Arab Revolt exposed Britain’s inability to maintain order without force and demonstrated deep-rooted Arab opposition to Zionist immigration and land sales.
In response, Britain reassessed its policies, leading to the Peel Commission (1937) and the first serious proposal for partition. The revolt also prompted Britain to issue the 1939 White Paper, which limited Jewish immigration and proposed an independent Palestinian state within 10 years.
This shift reflected Britain’s desire to placate Arab opinion, particularly as the Second World War approached and Middle Eastern oil and strategic alliances became vital.

Although partition offered less territory than Zionists hoped for, leaders such as David Ben-Gurion saw it as a pragmatic first step toward statehood.
Accepting partition gained international legitimacy and recognition of the principle of a Jewish state. Zionists believed that once sovereignty was achieved, future expansion or renegotiation of borders might follow.
Furthermore, the urgency of providing refuge for Jewish survivors of the Holocaust made even a limited state preferable to continued statelessness.

Post-war US pressure significantly affected British policy. President Harry S. Truman advocated the immediate admission of 100,000 Jewish refugees into Palestine, reflecting American public sympathy for Holocaust survivors.
Britain, struggling with post-war decline and reliant on American support, could not ignore Washington’s stance.
This pressure contributed to Britain’s decision to refer the issue to the United Nations in 1947, acknowledging that it could no longer manage the conflict alone. US influence also boosted Zionist diplomacy and strengthened calls for partition.

Demographics underpinned both sides’ strategic positions. Arabs, forming around two-thirds of Palestine’s population, feared partition would grant disproportionate land to the Jewish minority and undermine Arab dominance.
Zionists, despite being a minority, argued that continued immigration would rapidly change the demographic balance and secure the viability of a Jewish state.
This demographic tension contributed to Arab rejection of both the Peel Commission and UNSCOP plans, while Zionists viewed them as stepping stones toward demographic transformation.

Jerusalem’s unique religious and historical significance to Judaism, Christianity, and Islam made it a focal point of international concern.
Both the Peel Commission and UNSCOP proposals sought to avoid conflict by placing Jerusalem and surrounding holy sites under British or international administration.
This arrangement aimed to guarantee freedom of access to sacred places, prevent sectarian violence, and avoid one side gaining exclusive control.
Although this solution was widely accepted internationally, neither Arabs nor Jews were fully satisfied, viewing it as a compromise that diluted their claims to the city.

Practice Questions

Question 1 (2 marks):
What was the main proposal of the 1937 Peel Commission regarding the future of Palestine?

Mark Scheme (2 marks):

  • 1 mark for identifying that the Peel Commission proposed partitioning Palestine.

  • 1 additional mark for specifying how: it recommended creating separate Jewish and Arab states with Jerusalem under British control.

Question 2 (6 marks):
Explain why British attempts to resolve Arab–Jewish tensions in Palestine before 1948 were unsuccessful.

Mark Scheme (6 marks):
Award up to 6 marks for a balanced explanation, with 1 mark per valid point or developed explanation.
Indicative content may include:

  • Conflicting national aspirations: Arabs wanted independence and opposed Jewish immigration, while Zionists sought a Jewish homeland. (1–2 marks)

  • Ambiguity of the Balfour Declaration: Created mistrust as both sides interpreted it differently. (1 mark)

  • White Papers’ limitations: Policies like the 1939 White Paper alienated Zionists and failed to satisfy Arabs. (1 mark)

  • Rejection of partition plans: Arabs rejected the 1937 Peel Commission and 1947 UN proposals, preventing compromise. (1–2 marks)

  • Escalating violence: Arab Revolt (1936–39) and terrorism by both sides undermined negotiations. (1 mark)

  • British imperial priorities: Strategic concerns often led to inconsistent policies, reducing trust from both communities. (1 mark)

Level of detail and explanation determines the mark awarded:

  • 1–2 marks: Simple statements with limited explanation.

  • 3–4 marks: Some explanation with relevant examples.

  • 5–6 marks: Developed explanation with clear reasoning and multiple factors.

Hire a tutor

Please fill out the form and we'll find a tutor for you.

1/2
Your details
Alternatively contact us via
WhatsApp, Phone Call, or Email