OCR Specification focus:
‘Reasons for Israel’s survival and Arab attitudes, including ideas of perpetual war.’
Israel’s survival after 1948 transformed Middle Eastern geopolitics, shaped by superior organisation, international support, and fragmented Arab responses steeped in hostility and visions of ongoing conflict.
Foundations of Israel’s Survival
Military Organisation and Strategy
The new State of Israel emerged from the 1948 war with formidable resilience, largely due to its superior military structure and mobilisation. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) unified former militias, such as the Haganah, Irgun, and Lehi, into a single, centrally commanded force. This provided coherence in strategy and effective coordination during operations against disparate Arab armies.
Conscription and mobilisation enabled Israel to field proportionally larger forces than its Arab adversaries.
Israel’s emphasis on interior lines of communication allowed for rapid troop movements and concentration of forces where most needed.
High morale and motivation, rooted in existential threat and statehood aspirations, ensured a determined defence and counter-offensive capability.
Haganah: The main Jewish paramilitary organisation in Mandatory Palestine before 1948, forming the core of the Israel Defense Forces.
Leadership and Cohesion
Israel’s political and military leadership demonstrated unity and decisiveness. David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s first Prime Minister, prioritised state survival and directed resources accordingly. Strategic decisions—such as accepting UN Partition Plan boundaries initially but expanding beyond them when possible—showed adaptability.
Comparison map showing the UN Partition Plan of 1947 alongside the 1949 Armistice Lines (Green Line). It helps explain how Israel consolidated control after the 1948–49 fighting and why borders became central to subsequent disputes. Source
In contrast, Arab forces lacked a unified command. Each state pursued its own interests—Jordan focused on annexing the West Bank, Egypt sought regional leadership, and Syria and Iraq had divergent objectives—preventing coordinated strategy and undermining their collective strength.
International Support and Diplomacy
U.S. and Soviet Recognition
Early diplomatic recognition bolstered Israel’s legitimacy. The United States and Soviet Union both recognised the state swiftly, granting it international standing and opening avenues for support.
The U.S. provided diplomatic backing in the UN and later military and financial aid.
The USSR facilitated Jewish migration from Eastern Europe, bolstering Israel’s demographic and manpower base.
Diaspora and Arms Supplies
Global Jewish diaspora networks provided critical financial resources, while arms shipments from Czechoslovakia (with Soviet approval) during the 1948 war gave Israel a crucial advantage over Arab forces constrained by British arms embargoes.
Diaspora: The dispersion of a people from their homeland; in this context, Jewish communities outside Israel who supported the state’s establishment.
Demography, Immigration and State Building
Population Growth and Settlement
Mass immigration strengthened Israel’s capacity to defend and sustain itself. Holocaust survivors and Jews from Arab countries increased the population rapidly, creating a larger base for military conscription and economic development.
Between 1948 and 1951, Israel’s population doubled, enhancing its labour force and military potential.
Immigrants were settled strategically, reinforcing border regions and consolidating control over contested areas.
Institutional Strength and Statecraft
Israel built functioning state institutions with remarkable speed, establishing governance, legal systems, and infrastructure while fighting for survival. This state-building capacity contrasted sharply with the political instability and underdevelopment of many neighbouring Arab states.
Arab Responses and Attitudes
Shock and Rejection
Arab states were stunned by the 1948 defeat, often described as al-Nakba (the catastrophe). Rather than prompting reconciliation, the loss intensified hostility and entrenched rejection of Israel’s legitimacy.
Arab League members refused to recognise Israel and rejected peace negotiations.
Arab regimes used anti-Israeli rhetoric to bolster domestic legitimacy and divert attention from internal weaknesses.
al-Nakba: Arabic for "the catastrophe," referring to the displacement of Palestinian Arabs and the defeat of Arab armies in the 1948–1949 war.
Perpetual War Doctrine
A prevailing belief emerged among Arab leaders and intellectuals that Israel’s existence was temporary and must ultimately be reversed through continued struggle. This doctrine of perpetual war shaped policies across the region:
Arab League resolutions rejected negotiations and endorsed continued hostilities.
Fedayeen (Palestinian guerrilla fighters) raids into Israeli territory kept tensions high throughout the 1950s.
School curricula and state media propagated narratives of future liberation and reversal of 1948’s outcomes.
Refugee Crisis and Radicalisation
The displacement of approximately 700,000 Palestinian refugees became a central grievance and rallying point for Arab opposition.
UNRWA/UN Archives photograph of Palestinian families leaving Jaffa in 1948, pushing belongings in prams and carts. The image captures the immediacy of displacement that shaped regional attitudes toward Israel and became a focal point of Arab political identity. Source
Host states often denied refugees citizenship, preserving their statelessness as a political tool against Israel.
Refugee issues fuelled the rise of militant groups and underpinned later conflicts and negotiations.
Arab States: Divisions and Strategic Failures
Rivalries and Distrust
Arab unity against Israel was undermined by deep inter-Arab rivalries. Mutual suspicion and conflicting ambitions repeatedly prevented effective coordination.
King Abdullah of Jordan prioritised territorial gains over Palestinian independence, annexing the West Bank in 1950.
Egypt, under King Farouk and later Gamal Abdel Nasser, sought to position itself as the leader of Arab nationalism, sometimes clashing diplomatically with Syria and Iraq.
Efforts at joint command structures failed due to differing military doctrines, political goals, and mutual distrust.
Military and Structural Weaknesses
Arab armies suffered from poor training, inadequate logistics, and political interference. Many were monarchic conscript forces ill-prepared for modern warfare, lacking Israel’s cohesive command and strategic flexibility.
Egypt’s army, despite numerical superiority, was poorly supplied and led, resulting in defeats in the Negev and elsewhere.
Syrian and Iraqi contingents were small and uncoordinated, unable to sustain prolonged offensives.
Ideological Responses and the Long War
Rise of Pan-Arabism
The aftermath of 1948 became a crucible for Pan-Arabist ideology, advocating unity to confront Israel and Western imperialism. Leaders like Nasser promoted the notion that only a united Arab world could reverse the humiliation of 1948.
Arab media portrayed Israel as a colonial outpost, reinforcing narratives of illegitimacy.
Liberation of Palestine became central to Arab League declarations and summit agendas.
Institutionalising Opposition
Arab states institutionalised their opposition through policies and alliances:
The Arab League’s boycott of Israel targeted trade and diplomatic recognition.
Support for Palestinian organisations increased, setting the stage for the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) in 1964.
Military pacts and defence agreements, though often ineffective, reflected a commitment to eventual confrontation.
Government Press Office (Israel) image depicting an incident near Nir Galim (1956) involving fedayeen, indicative of cross-border violence that intensified the long war mentality. While the photograph shows the aftermath of an attack, it is historically instructive for understanding the period’s security dynamics. Source
FAQ
Israeli intelligence networks, many built during the British Mandate, provided crucial information about Arab troop movements and intentions. This enabled pre-emptive strikes and defensive positioning that often caught Arab forces unprepared.
Effective use of radio communication allowed the IDF to coordinate units quickly across multiple fronts, a key advantage over the poorly coordinated Arab armies. These capabilities compensated for Israel’s initial numerical inferiority and enhanced its ability to respond flexibly to shifting battlefield conditions.
Arab leaders leveraged al-Nakba as a unifying narrative to consolidate power and deflect internal criticism following the defeat.
It served as a rallying cry for Arab nationalism and a justification for increased militarisation.
Regimes presented themselves as defenders of the Palestinian cause, strengthening their legitimacy at home.
In some cases, the emphasis on resistance allowed governments to silence dissent by portraying critics as weakening the struggle against Israel.
Most Arab governments deliberately avoided full integration of Palestinian refugees to maintain the political focus on reversing Israel’s creation.
Granting citizenship was often withheld to preserve refugees’ identity and their claim to return.
Camps remained centres of political activism and resistance, reinforcing anti-Israel sentiment.
Some states, such as Jordan, offered limited integration, but others like Lebanon and Syria restricted rights to keep the Palestinian question unresolved and as leverage in future negotiations.
The disorganisation and conflicting aims of Arab armies in 1948 exposed the need for better coordination, leading to later attempts to create joint command structures and shared defence treaties.
Organisations like the Joint Arab Command emerged in the 1950s and 1960s to improve planning.
Arab states sought to modernise their forces with Soviet or Western equipment to match Israel’s capabilities.
However, deep political rivalries often undermined these efforts, and coordination remained inconsistent even in later conflicts such as 1967.
Fedayeen raids, launched from neighbouring Arab states into Israeli territory, symbolised the ongoing Arab commitment to reversing 1948’s outcome.
They were often supported or tolerated by Arab governments, particularly Egypt under Nasser, as part of the perpetual war doctrine.
These raids provoked Israeli retaliatory strikes, escalating tensions and hardening hostility on both sides.
The violence contributed to the cycle of conflict and mistrust, influencing key events like the Suez Crisis of 1956 and shaping the region’s long-term security dynamics.
Practice Questions
Question 1 (2 marks):
Identify two reasons why Israel was able to survive the First Arab–Israeli War of 1948–49.
Mark Scheme:
1 mark for each correct reason identified, up to 2 marks.
Accept any two of the following (or similar wording):Superior organisation and unity of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).
Fragmented and poorly coordinated Arab military response.
International support, such as arms supplies from Czechoslovakia.
Strong motivation and morale among the Israeli population.
Rapid state-building and mobilisation of resources.
Question 2 (6 marks):
Explain how Arab attitudes towards Israel after 1948 were shaped by the outcome of the First Arab–Israeli War.
Mark Scheme:
Award up to 6 marks based on the following levels:
Level 1 (1–2 marks): Limited knowledge shown. Basic statements with little explanation. May mention hostility or refusal to recognise Israel but lacks depth.
Level 2 (3–4 marks): Some knowledge and explanation. Mentions rejection of Israel’s legitimacy and possibly the concept of al-Nakba or perpetual war, but explanation may be underdeveloped.
Level 3 (5–6 marks): Good knowledge and clear explanation. Explains that the 1948 defeat intensified Arab hostility, leading to a doctrine of perpetual war, refusal to recognise Israel, and policies such as the Arab League boycott. May also mention the impact of the Palestinian refugee crisis as a rallying point and the rise of Pan-Arabism aimed at reversing the outcome of the war.
Indicative points for full marks:
The defeat in 1948 was seen as a humiliation (al-Nakba) and entrenched Arab rejection of Israel’s legitimacy.
Arab states refused to recognise Israel and rejected peace talks.
The idea of a perpetual struggle to destroy Israel became widespread.
The Palestinian refugee crisis became central to Arab identity and anti-Israel policies.
Rise of Pan-Arabism and collective Arab efforts, including boycotts and support for fedayeen raids.
